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COMMENTS
EFFECT OF ADVERTISING ON MANUFACTURER'S
LIABILITY TO ULTIMATE PURCHASER
INTRODUCTION
Today the manufacturer, by means of newspapers, television and
other media of communication, extols his products in an effort to
persuade the public to purchase them. The public usually purchases
from a retailer, often in reliance upon the manufacturer's advertising.
When a member of the public is injured thereby, should the manu-
facturer be allowed to defend suit on the ground that there is no
"privity" between the ultimate purchaser and himself ? Many a layman,
after watching his favorite television program, goes to his neighbor-
hood store and, upon the strength of the sponsor's recommendations,
purchases the product so advertised. If as a direct result he suffers
injury, to himself or his property, he would certainly be surprised to
learn that he cannot recover the amount of his damage from the one
who has made such glowing statements, merely because he has not
purchased the product directly from him.'
He has not much chance of recovery in an action for deceit.
Courts have recognized that such things as radio2 and newspaper 3
advertisements and statements in catalogs4 can be the basis for a cause
of action in deceit. They have explicitly held that the consumer is
in the class at which the advertisement is directed. 5 However, the
action against the advertising manufacturer would be blocked by the
requirement of scienter which is imposed by most courts.6
The possibility of recovery in an action for negligence has im-
proved somewhat since the days of Winterbottom v. Wright.7 The first
exception to the requirement of privity was created in the area of
food and drugs ;8 the second, in the case of an "imminently dangerous"
1"The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon
the intricacies of the law of sales." Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322
(S.D. N.Y. 1912).
2 Ralston Purina Co. v. Cox, 141 Neb. 432, 3 N.W. 2d 748 (1942).
3 Christakos v. Lockwood, 194 F. 2d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
4 Davidson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 Ill. App. 355 (1910) ; Kuelling v.
Roderick Lean Mfg. Co., 84 N.Y. Supp. 622 (App. Div. 1903).
- Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S.W. 2d 859 (1931) ; Roberts
v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n., 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95 (1912).
6 PROSSER, TORTS §88 (2d ed. 1955).
710 Mees & W. 109, 152 Eng. 402 (1842).
8 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852). This has been
applied in Hruska v. Parke, Davis & Co., 6 F. 2d 536 (8th Cir. 1925) (drug,
advertisement); Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, 10 S.E. 118 (1889)
(patent medicine label) ; Parks v. G. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac.
202 (1914) (food); Wilson v. Fergusen Co., 214 Mass. 265, 101 N.E. 381
(1913) (food, advertisement). In only one case, Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S.W. 1009 (1915), has a court refused to
extend the doctrine to cover chewing tobacco. The following courts have
applied the Thomas v. Winchester exception in chewing tobacco cases: Lig-
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article;9 and the third, in the case of articles which became "in-
herently dangerous" if defectively manufactured.'0 Furthermore, where
the manufacturer has advertised, the courts are quick to impose upon
him a duty to warn that the product may be dangerous," or to give
directions as to proper use.12 However, the burden of proof in a neg-
ligence action may be nearly impossible to carry, since means of proof
are almost exclusively within the control of the defendant. 3 Even
where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applied, plaintiff will have
difficulty in proving that the product was in the exclusive control
of the defendant at the time of the accident.'14 Where a statute
requires a product to be clearly labelled, the court may15 or may not,'6
find that a violation thereof is negligence per se. In actions against
the manufacturer based on the Pure Food and Drug Acts, some courts
have held that violation of the statute was negligence per se, and have
allowed the consumer to recover.' 7 Others have held that violation
gett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 246 Ky. 65, 54 S.W. 2d 612 (1932);
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loftin, 99 So. 13 (Miss. 1924); Caudle v. Bohannon
Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105, 16 S.E. 2d 680 (1941); Delk v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 180 S.C. 436, 186 S.E. 383 (1936); Webb v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Co., 121 W. Va. 115, 2 S.E. 2d 898 (1939).
9 Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903). This
has been applied in Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 Fed. 475 (E.D.
Mich. 1918) (rifle advertisement); Bundy v. Ey-Teb, Inc., 289 NY. Supp.
905 (N.Y. City Ct. 1935) (mascara, label); Karr v. Inecto, Inc., 247 N.Y.
360, 160 N.E. 398 (1928) (hair dye, pamphlet) ; Peterson v. Standard Oil Co.,
55 Ore. 511, 106 Pac. 337 (1910) (kerosene, label) ; Marsh v. Usk Hardware
Co., 73 Wash. 543, 132 Pac. 241 (1913) (explosive, circular).
20 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). This
has been applied in Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.
2d 820 (1949) (chemical dust); Lill v. Murphy Door Bed Co., 290 Ill. App.
328, 8 N.E. 2d 714 (1937) (wall bed, catalogue). In Livesley v. Continental
Motors Corp., 331 Mich. 434, 49 N.W. 2d 365 (1951) (air plane connecting
rod, no advertising involved), the court refused to apply it.
1'Wolcho v. Rosenbluth, 81 Conn. 358, 71 Atl. 566 (1908) (enamel, label);
Lehner v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 136 N.Y.S. 2d 121 (N.Y. City Ct.
1954) (detergent, television advertisements); Henry v. Cook, 195 N.Y. Supp.
642 (App. Div. 1922) (sparklers, label). Contra, Benzor v. Howell, 203 Wis.
1, 233 N.W. 758 (1930) (sparklers, no advertising involved).
12 E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 73 F. 2d 26 (8th Cir. 1934) (seed
disinfectant, label and pamphlets); Lehner v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.,
supra note 11; Rosenbusch v. Ambrosia Milk Corp., 168 N.Y. Supp. 505 (App.
Div. 1917) (dried milk, label and circulars).
'3E.g., Saena v. Zenith Optical Co., 135 W. Va. 795, 65 S.E. 2d 205 (1951)
(coffee maker, printed replacement warranty).
14 But the doctrine has been invoked successfully, even in "exploding bottle"
cases. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436 (1944).
15 Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953) (seed).
16 Levine v. Muser, 110 Neb. 515, 194 N.W. 672 (1923) (medicine).
'17Hunter v. Derby Foods, 110 F. 2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Mesbesher v. Channe-
lene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N.W. 428 (1909); Bolitho v. Safeway
Stores, 109 Mont. 213, 95 P. 2d 443 (1939) (retailer liable to third person) ;
Pine Grove Poultry Farm v. Newton By-Products Mfg. Co., 248 N.Y. 293,
162 N.E. 84 (1928) (poultry food, Farms and Markets Law) ; Portage Mar-
kets v. Gearge, 111 Ohio St. 775, 146 N.E. 283 (1924) ; Hollis v. Armour &
Co., 190 S.C. 170, 2 S.E. 2d 681 (1939); Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5
Wash. 2d 284, 105 P. 2d 76 (1940).
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was merely some proof of negligence.18 This theory does not seem to
have been advanced often and is relatively unimportant today, since
courts are having little difficulty in imposing an absolute liability on
the manufacturer of food or beverages.' 9 Printers' Ink statutes
20
impose absolute criminal liability on one who issues false or mis-
leading advertising, but have apparently not been employed to impose
civil liability on the advertiser.2 1  The Uniform Commercial Code 22
purposely avoids this problem. 23
Eliminating, then, the possibilities of deceit and negligence, it be-
comes clear that the ultimate purchaser's best chance for recovery
lies in the area of express warranty. It is the purpose of this article
to demonstrate that he should have an action for breach of express
warranty, either at common law or under the Uniform Sales Act,24
against the manufacturer who advertises, even though the goods were
purchased from a retailer.
I. PRIVITY AN HIsToRIcAL AcCIDENT
The stumbling block in the path of the ultimate purchaser who
wishes to sue the manufacturer for breach of warranty is, of course,
the judicially-imposed requirement of privity. Of late, it has fre-
quently been pointed out that this requirement originated in the courts'
misinterpretation of the original common law action for breach of war-
ranty.25 Originally, the injured consumer's relief was in an action
on the case for deceit, in which an essential allegation was warranti-
zando vendidit or warrantizando barganizasset.2 6 "The gist of the
I Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916); Cheli v. Cudahy
Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N.W. 14 (1934); Howson v. Foster Beef Co.,
87 N.H. 200, 177 Atl. 656 (1935).
19 See Part III, infra.
20 E.g., WIs. STAT. §100.18 (1957).
21 Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 39 YALE L. J. 22 (1929) ; Com-
ment, 36 YALE L. J. 1155 (1927).
22 §2-318. "A seller's warranty whether expressed or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a
guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume, or be affected by the gods and who is injured in person by breach
of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section."
23 The framers' comment on this section is as follows: "This section expressly
includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family, household, and
guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not in-
tended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's
warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the
distributive chain." This article is concerned, however, with warranties made
directly to the sub-purchaser.
24 Section 12, which defines an express warranty, is considered a codification
of the common law definition. 1 WILLISTON, SALES §194 (Rev. ed. 1948).25 Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W. 2d 532
(St. Louis Ct. App. 1952); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., - Ohio
App. -, 149 N.E. 2d 181 (1958); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167
Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958); Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability
to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134 (1937);
Skeel,Product Warranty Liability, 6 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rxv. 94 (1957).
26 1 WILUSTON, SALES §195 (Rev. ed. 1948).
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action being the deceit in breaking a promise on the faith of which
the plaintiff had been induced to part with his money or other property,
it was obviously immaterial whether the promisor or a third person
got the benefit of what the plaintiff gave up."' 7 This action was, then,
regarded as purely ex delicto,28 and there was no need to prove either
scienter or intent to defraud. Thus, it appears that even express
warranty was, to this extnt, an obligation imposed by law.29 Originally,
the action of indebitatus assunpsit ° was also ex delicto.3 1 By a
natural transition, indebitatus assumpsit became the method of asserting
the cause of action upon a warranty, 2 when it was recognized that a
warranty could be a part of a sales agreement, and, therefore, not
necessarily collateral in legal effect. Because of the marketing condi-
tions of the times, the one who sold the goods to the injured consumer
was generally the one who made the representation upon which the
consumer relied. Thus, even though privity was not an essential
part of the cause of action, since warranty was an obligation imposed
by law, it was, coincidentally, present in the early cases. In fact,
only with the advent of our modern communication system would it be
possible to have a fact situation where there was the reliance neces-
sary to support a warranty action except where the parties had actually
dealt with each other.3 3 If, then, reliance be recognized as the basis
for an action on express warranty, there is no justification in al-
lowing the advertising manufacturer to hide behind the skirts of the
ancient, mistakenly-imposed requirement of privity.3 4
II. ADVERTISING AS EXPRESS WARRANTY
Where the manufacturer's advertising amounts to an express war-
ranty, the ultimate purchaser should be able to recover tort damages
for a breach, notwithstanding lack of privity. The first case to drop
the requirement of privity when advertising entered the scene was
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co. 3 5 The court held that privity was unneces-
27 Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REv. 1, 14 (1888).
28 Breach of warranty is considered today as ex delicto, at least in part. VOLD,
SALEs §140 (1931).
29 Skeel, supra note 25, at 98.
30 Slade's Case; 4 Rep. 92b; Yelv 21; Moore, 433,667 (1603).
31 Ames, supra note 27, at 3.
32 Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Douglas 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (1778), is the first reported
decision in which assumpsit was brought upon a vendor's warranty, but two
of the Justices remarked that the practice was a familiar one. This was
acknowledged in Williamson v. Allison, 2 East 446, 102 Eng. Rep. 439 (1802),
to be the first case which discussed the question.
33 Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery on Warranty, 19
N.C.L. REv. 551 (1941):
34 "If privity of contract is required, then, under the situation and circumstances
of modem merchandise in such matters, privity of contract exists in the
consciousness and understanding of all right-thinking persons." Madourous v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W. 2d 445 (1936).
35 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d (1932). "Radio, billboards, and the products of the
printing press have become the means of creating a large part of the demand
that causes goods to depart from factories to the ultimate consumer. It would
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sary since the manufacturer had made representations about its prod-
uct, in its printed circular, upon which the plaintiff had relied when
he purchased. 36
That an advertisement can constitute an express warranty has
been recognized several times.3 7  Some courts have specifically held
Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act, which defines an express war-
ranty,3s applicable in suits by consumers where the manufacturers'
statements appeared in circulars and on labels. The Nebraska Court
held that manufacturer's statement in its circular that its bacterin would
establish immunity (in animals) in ten to twelve days was an express
warranty. 39 The Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit found that a
table of tensile strengths, contained in a manufacturers' manual, was
an express warranty under the Pennsylvania Uniform Sales Act.40 In
California, it was held that an analysis, appearing on the label of
the container, of the insecticide therein, was an express warranty
"that the ingredients listed were the only active ones contained in
the spray."41 Where the label on a bottle of liniment read "For man
and beast . . . Follow directions carefully and you will be rewarded
with good results," the Minnesota Court found an express warranty.42
be unjust to recognize a rule that would permit manufacturers of goods to
create a demand for their products by representing that they possess qualities
which they, in fact, do not possess, and then, because there is no privity of
contract existing between the consumer and the manufacturer, deny the con-
sumer the right to recover if damages result from the absence of those quali-
ties, when such absence is not readily noticeable." Id. at 412.
36 This case has been the subject of considerable speculation. When the case
reached the Washington Supreme Court again, after retrial on the issue of
proximate cause, the court recognized that its decision had been based on
breach of warranty and reluctantly reaffirmed its stand, in language appropri-
ate for an action in deceit. 179 Wash. 123, 35 P. 2d 1090 (1934). The author
of a note at 7 WASH. L. Rav. 351 (1932) argues that the basis of the holding
must have been breach of express warranty. This, indeed, is what a later
Washington Court, in Murphy v. Plymouth Motor Corp., 3 Wash. 2d 180, 100
P. 2d 30 (1940), called it. Another writer dubbed it negligent advertising.
Note, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 406 (1937). Still another listed four possibilities:
that historically warranty was a tort action in which privity was not required,
that the decision was an application of the MacPherson rule, deceit, or a
holding that warranty runs with personal property as does a convenant with
land. Note, 18 Colin. L.Q. 445 (1933). See also Freezer, Manufacturer's Lia-
bility for Injuries Caused by His Product: Defective Automobiles, 37 MicH.
L. Rav. 1 (1938); Note, 46 HARv. L. RE-v. 161 (1932).37 Matthew v. Croene, 2 lI. App. 2d 529, 119 N.E. 2d 830 (1954) ; King v. Ohio
Valley Terminex Co., 309 Ky. 35, 214 S.W. 2d 993 (1948); Turner v. Central
Hardware Co., 353 Mo. App. 1182, 186 S.W. 2d 603 (1945) ; Meyer v. Packard
Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922).
38 "Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is
an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is
to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the
goods relying thereon...."
89 Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W. 2d 151 (1957).
40 Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F. 2d 445 (3rd Cir. 1946). However, the court
disallowed recovery since the rope, as to which the affirmation had been made,
had not been used as intended by the manufacturer.
41 Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041 (1954). And see
dissent in Jordon v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E. 2d 49, 52 (1949).
42Randall v. Goodrich Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10, 54 N.W. 2d 769 (1952).
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Several other courts, without reference to the Uniform Sales Act,
have found express warranties in manufacturers' statements appear-
ing in newspaper advertisements, in circulars, on labels and on tags,
and, disregarding the privity usually required in consumer-manufacturer
suits, have allowed the purchaser to recover. The year after the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decided Burr v. Sherwin Williams,4" a District
Court of Appeals in that state held, without direct mention of the Uni-
form Sales Act, that the manufacturer's statement, "Boned Chicken,"
in newspaper advertisements and on the label of a can, was an express
warranty." In an analogous situation another appellate court found
the manufacturer liable to a retailer who, through middlemen, had pur-
chased soap on the label of which were the words, "Guaranty of Quality
. . . If Frederick's granulated soap does not meet with your entire
approval your dealer will cheerfully refund the full purchase price,"
where the soap was inferior and did not sell.4 5 Where an automobile
manufacturer made the statement, in circulars furnished to its dealers,
that the roofs of its cars were made of "seamless steel," the Michigan
Court found an express warranty."6 The Nebraska Court held that
manufacturer's statement on the label of a bottle of insecticide that the
substance was "not poisonous to human beings" was an express war-
ranty where plaintiff became infected with boils after having come into
contact with the solution.4 7 Before the Uniform Sales Act was passed
in Pennsylvania, the tag on a case of tobacco, which described the con-
tents as to number and weight, was held, by application of trade cus-
tom, to constitute an express warranty.4 s The requirement of privity
has since been obliterated from Pennsylvania law. 49 An automobile
manufacturer's warranty, buried, with the reservation of its right to
change model or design, in the fine print of the order blank used by
the retailer, was held in New York to base an action for breach of
express warranty. 50
The Ohio Court, admittedly overturning precedent, recently held
that nation-wide advertising by the manufacturer of a home permanent
4342 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041 (1954).44 Lane v. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P. 2d 723 (Dist. Ct. App.
1955).
45 Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P. 2d 854 (App. Dept. 1948).46 Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
Contra, Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F. 2d 597 (2d Cir. 1938) ;
Hermanson v. Hermanson, 19 Conn. Sup. 479, 117 A. 2d 840 (1954) (warranty
not made to plaintiff), in each of which recovery was disallowed for lack of
privity.
47 Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E. 2d 813 (1940). The court
expressed its belief that the warranty "runs with the product into the con-
sumer's hands." Id. at 816. This language is typical of cases in implied
warranty, but the over-all language of the opinion indicates that the court
considered the warranty express.
48 Conestoga Cigar Co. v. Finke, 144 Pa. 159, 22 Atl. 868 (1891).49 Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F. 2d 445, 450-451 (3rd Cir. 1946).
50 Pelletier v. Brown Bros. Chevrolet & Oldsmobile, Inc., 164 N.Y.S. 2d 249
(Sup. Ct. 1956).
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constituted an express warranty in a suit by the purchaser after she
lost her hair from using the product.51
Surely under modern merchandising practices the manufacturer
owes a very real obligation toward those who consume or use
his products. The warranties made by the manufacturer in his
advertisements and by the labels on his products are induce-
ments to the ultimate consumers, and the manufacturer ought
to be held to strict accountability to any consumer who buys
the product in reliance upon such representations and later suf-
fers because the product proves to be defective or deleterious. 5 2
Thus, the court indicates that the statements must constitute an ex-
press warranty, and that the plaintiff must have relied thereon. On the
other hand, it appears to require no relationship between the advertise-
ment and the type of harm suffered. This comes to the very brink of
saying that nation-wide advertising, per se, amounts to an express
warranty, without regard to plaintiff's right to rely thereon.
Only two courts have adhered to the requirement of privity where
the plaintiff, basing his cause of action upon manufacturer's statements,
has pleaded and proved the elements of breach of an express war-
ranty. 53 Where no specific advertisement was apparently involved, the
New Hampshire Court explicitly rejected as minority law the theory
that manufacturers' advertisements became warranties by reason of
their being directed to the ultimate purchaser.5 4 The theory, however,
is no longer minority, although the specific issue has not been presented
to many courts.
III. IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY AS TREND
In fact, the recent trend, in the area of warranties generally, has
been to impose liability on the manufacturer, even though the element
of advertising is not present.5 This is most obvious in those cases
51 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612(1958). Defendant had advertised its product as "gentle." In Chanin v.
Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F. 2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937), plaintiff based his appellate
argument on defendant-manufacturer's extensive advertising campaign, but
the court refused to decide the issue since the complaint had contained no
such allegations.
52 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., supra note 51, at 615-616.5 3 Frier v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., 173 Kan. 733, 252 P. 2d 850(1953); Degouveia v. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W. 2d 336
(1936) (wholesaler). In the former case, the court held that the manufactur-
er's statement on a box of detergent, "Tide is kind to hands," was not an
express warranty. Both of these cases should be compared to a more recent
Missouri case, Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114,
253 S.W. 2d 532 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1952), in which the court found that the
statement, "Tide is kind to hands," created an inplied warranty.
54 Smith v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A. 2d 125 (1942).
55 However, in Whitehorn v. Nash-Finch Co., 67 S.D. 465, 293 N.W. 859 (1940),
where defendant was a wholesaler, the court denied recovery saying, "We
are inclined to the view that lacking representation to the public in the form
of advertisements, labels, or other similar forms, there is no warranty to a
sub-purchaser upon which to predicate liability." Id. at 860
1959]
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in which plaintiff has incurred physical injury from food or drink.56 In
such cases, the courts of at least twenty states have held the manufac-
turer liable to the ultimate purchaser usually under the theory of implied
warranty.57 This is in accord with the position of the common law
courts even prior to the action of assumpsit. The seller of food and
drink was bound by the nature of his calling to sell wholesome wares,5
so in a deceit action against him for false warranty it was not necessary
to allege an express warranty of quality. 59 Today, most courts which
impose liability without privity do so under this same "broad principle
of the public policy to protect human health and life." 60 Advertising
has had an effect upon the food manufacturer's liability under this
imposed-by-law obligation in some states.6 '
56 This is parallel to the first exception which was developed to the rule that
privity must support an action for negligence. See supra note 8.
57 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Ezzell, 22 Ala. App. 210, 114 So. 278 (1927) ; Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P. 2d 1094 (1957); Klein v.
Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d 799 (1939), extended to dog
food in McAfee v. Cargill, 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ;Coca-Cola Bottl-
ing Co. v. Todd, 101 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1958); Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E. 2d 162 (1947) ; Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa
1023, 274 N.W. 48 (1937), and Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775,
176 N.W. 382 (1920) ; Nicholas v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P. 2d 317 (1953),
and Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. 2d 930(1938); North American Fertilizer Co. v. Combs, 307 Ky. 869, 212 S.W. 2d
526 (1948) (dicta), and Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W.
2d 701 (1930) ; Le Blanc v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d
873 (1952); Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924);
Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N.W. 428(1909) (under Pure Food and Drug Act); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v.
Simpson, 158 Miss. 390, 130 So. 479 (1930); Helms v. General Baking Co.,
164 S.W. 2d 150 (Mo. App. 1942); Lardaro v. M B S Cigar Corp. 177 N.Y.S.
2d 5 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1957), and Conklin v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria Corp., 161
N.Y.S. 2d 205 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1957); Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.
2d 822 (1951) (dicta) ; Ward Baking Co v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161
N.E. 557 (1928); Griffin v. Asbury, 196 Old. 484, 165 P. 2d 822 (1945); Mock
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (1931) ; Hollis
v. Armour & Co., 190 S.C. 170, 2 S.E. 2d 681 (1939) (under Pure Food and
Drug Act) ; Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.
2d 828 (1942) ; Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
58 "[N]o man can justify selling corrupt victual, but an action on the case lies
against the seller, whether the victual was warranted to be good or not."
Note in Keilway's Rep. 91 (22 Hen. VII, 72 Eng. 254).
59 Ames, supra note 27, at 8.
60 Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828, 829
(1942).
61 Swengel v. F & E Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. 2d 930 (1938);
Le Blanc v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952) ; fToca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Smith, 97 S.W. 2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Li.rdaro
v. M B S Cigar Corp., 177 N.Y.S. 2d 6 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1957). "It would be
but to acknowledge a weakness in the law to say that [the manufacturer]
could thus [by using newspapers, magazines, billboards and the radio to b'iild
up the psychology to buy and consume his products] create a demand for his
products by inducing a belief that they are suitable for human consumption,
when, as a matter of fact, they are not, and reap the benefits of the public
confidence thus created, and then avoid liability for the injuries caused
thereby merely because there was no privity of contract between him and the
one whom he induced to consume the food." Jacob E. Decker & Sons v
Capps, supra note 60, at 833.
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In their endeavor to give relief to the injured consumer, the courts
have employed a variety of fictions. These can best be summarized as
follows: that the contract between manufacturer and retailer is for
the consumer's benefit,62 that the consumer is assignee of retailer's
rights,6 3 that the retailer is the manufacturer's agent,64 that the manu-
facturer's implied warranty runs with the chattel as does a covenant
with land.,6  All of these have been used to find liability in the food
and beverage area.68 Two were used to extend liability into other areas.
Under the third party beneficiary contract theory, an Ohio Court of Ap-
peals found an implied warranty where a rusty wire was imbedded in a
cake of soap.67 The view that implied warranty runs with the chattel
was expressed by a federal district court, where a shipment combining
ferrous and non-ferrous materials resulted in damage to plaintiff's
property. 8 An additional argument has been presented by a few writers
who point out that, by authority of the Carbolic Smoke Ball case, 0 an
advertisement can constitute an offer. They argue from this that the
manufacturer's representations could be regarded as a unilateral con-
tract, or a general offer which is accepted by the consumer when he
purchases from the retailer.7' The use of these fictions illustrates the
tendency to dispense with the requirement of privity, but such use of
fiction would be clearly unnecessary if the plaintiff had a cause of action
in express warranty based upon advertisements by the manufacturer.
62 Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 4 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P. 2d 833 (1938) (food);
Conklin v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria Corp., 161 N.Y.S. 2d 205 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1957) (food); Lardaro v. M B S Cigar Corp., supra note 61 (food) ; Ward
Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928) (food).6 3 Madouros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W. 2d 445
(1936) (beverage).
64 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913) (food).
6 5 Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Shop Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d 799 (1939)
(food); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920)(food) ; Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111. So. 305 (1927)(beverage); Lardaro v. M B S Cigar Corp., 177 N.Y.S. 2d 6 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1957) (food); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Smith, 97 S.W. 2d 761 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936) (beverage).6 6 The theory applied in Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155
(1924), is frequently referred to as a "fiction." The court held that the
manufacturer of food had a duty to guard against poison and that placing
the product on the market was an implied warranty of freedom from poison.
It does not seem accurate to call the manufacturer's "duty to public" fictitious.6 7 Kruper v. Procter & Gamble Co., 113 N.E. 2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953). Has-
brouck v. Armour & Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N.W. 157 (1909) involved the
same facts but the action was brought in negligence. The court denied re-
covery on the ground that the case did not fall within one of the three
exceptions to the privity requirement.GSLaclede Steel Co. v. Silas Mason Co., 67 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. La. 1946).
Defendant had advertised that its shipment would conform to O.P.A. and
W.P.B. requirements, which prohibited such combination.
69 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1 Q.B. 256 (1893).
70 1 WILLSTON, CoNaAcrs §27 (Rev. ed. 1936); Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's
Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. Rv.
134 (1937); Note, 6 VAND. L. Rvv. 376 (1953); Note, 22 WAsH. U.L.Q. 406(1937).
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The courts' inclination to allow recovery notwithstanding lack of
privity is further demonstrated by cases in which advertising has been
held to give rise to an implied, rather than express, warranty. 71 Where
the manufacturer stated on its box of detergent that "Tide is kind to
hands," the St. Louis Court of Appeals, taking cognizance of the exten-
sive advertising done by manufacturers, held that the manufacturer
could be liable for breach of implied warranty.72
Such representations, being inducements to buyers making the
purchase, should be regarded as warranties imposed by law,
independent of the vendor's contractual intentions. The liability
thus imposed springs from representations directed to the ulti-
mate consumer, and not from the breach of any contractual
undertaking on the part of the vendor. 73
An assertion that a product is "kind to hands" seems little different
from one which states that the user of a product "will be rewarded with
good results." Yet, in the latter situation, the Minnesota Court found
an express warranty. 74 However, where the label on a bottle merely in-
dicated that the intended use of the product was as shampoo, the same
court allowed recovery on the theory of implied warranty. 75 Applying
this case, a federal district court held that instructions on the label
of a jar of shampoo gave rise to an implied warranty. 76 The statement
on a label of a can of beans that "The contents of this can are ready
for the table and can be served hot or cold," was construed not as an
express warranty, but as an implied warranty of fitness for human con-
sumption.77 Such fact situations should be compared to those in which
the manufacturer definitely states that his product is "non-poisonous," 8
71 A newspaper advertisement was held to create an implied warranty in an
action between buyer and seller, as well. Huscher v. Pfost, 122 Col. 301,
221 P. 2d 931 (1950).
72 Worley v. Procter & Gamble Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W. 2d 532 (1952).
However, the court denied recovery since plaintiff had not proved proximate
cause.
73 Worley v. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 72, at 537. Compare this with
the language used by the court in the Rogers case, supra note 52, where the
court found an express warranty.
74Randall v. Goodrich Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10, 54 N.W. 2d 769 (1952).
T Pietrus v. Watkins Co., 229 Minn. 179, 38 N.W. 2d 799 (1949). "Implied
therein was a warranty that for such purposes it was suitable and fit." Id.
at 801.
76 Raymond v. J. R. Watkins Co., 88 F. Supp. 932 (D. Minn. 1950). However,
on appeal the judgment for plaintiff was reversed on the ground that she had
had not proved causation. 184 F. 2d 925 (8th Cir. 1950).
7 Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920). How-
ever the decision was based on manufacturer's absolute duty to distribute
pure and wholesome food, rather than upon its statement. In Nelson v.
Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 S.W. 288 (1905), where the label on a
can of meat read "These tongues are selected, preserved and packed with
due reference to their keeping in all climates, guaranteed," and plaintiff
alleged breach of implied warranty based thereon, the court, without refer-
ence to the label, held that there could be no recovery without privity.
78 Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E. 2d 813 (1940). However,
in Williams v. Kress & Co., 48 Wash. 2d 88, 291 P. 2d 662 (1956), where
manufacturer's label said that its mouthwash was "safe," plaintiff could not
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or made of "seamless steel,"7 9 or "boneless,"89 where courts have found
express warranties. These decisions indicate that at least some courts
are influenced by the contents of the statement. 81
On the other hand, as has been shown, courts have found express
warranties in such seemingly vague statements as that the product was
"gentle,"8 2 "would establish immunity,"8 3 or "would meet with your
entire approval,"' ' 4 and in a mere table of tensile strengths," and in a
chemical analysis of contents,s6 and in a description of contents.8 7 Thus
it appears that most courts will give a liberal, if not strained, construc-
tion to the language employed by the advertising manufacturer s s
Such construction will apparently no longer be necessary in Ohio
where the Court of Appeals whose decision 9 was affirmed in the Rogers
v. Toni Home Permanent Co. case,90 thereafter went a step further,
under facts identical with those in the Rogers case, and held that na-
tion-wide advertising by a manufacturer gave rise to an implied, as
well as an express warranty.91 The court reasoned that since implied
warranty is an obligation imposed by law, the law can impose an obliga-
tion where the manufacturer has engaged in an extensive advertising
campaign.9 2
recover on the theory of implied warranty since she had not relied on re-
tailer's skill and judgment. The court did not consider the possibility of
express warranty. It would seem that even if implied warranty were the
proper basis for an action involving advertising, reliance upon retailer's skill
and judgment should not be an element of a suit against a manufacturer.79 Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 228 N.W. 309 (1939).80 Lane v. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P. 2d 723 (Dist. Ct. App.
1955).81In Murphy v. Plymouth Motor Corp., 3 Wash. 2d 180, 100 P. 2d 30 (1940),
the court rejected plaintiff's theory that pictures, rather than statements,
published by manufacturer, established an implied warranty.
8? Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612
(1958).
83 Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W. 2d 151 (1957).
84 Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P. 2d 854 (App. Dept. 1948).
85 Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F. 2d 445 (3rd Cir. 1946).
86 Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041 (1954). The
court specifically rejected the theory that defendant could be liable, on ac-
count of its advertising, under an implied warranty.
87 Conestoga Cigar Co v. Finke, 144 Pa. 159, 22 Atl. 868 (1891).
88 The tendency is "to construe every affirmation by [the seller] to be a war-
ranty when such construction is at all reasonable." Lane v. Swanson & Sons,
130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P. 2d 723, 726 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
89 105 Ohio App. 53, 139 N.E. 2d 871 (1958).
90 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958).
91 Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., - Ohio App. -, 149 N.E. 2d 181
(1958). Appeal from this decision is not being contemplated. Letter from
John R. Kistner, attorney for defendant, 28 July 1958.
92 "The ultimate buyer would not have become a purchaser of the subject of the
sale had it not been for the representations of the manufacturer or producer
made to the ultimate purchaser to induce his use of the product. If such
representations are such (as requiring a purchase by description or for a
particular purpose), the law would imply a warranty under the circumstances
and such implied warranty becomes an obligation of the manufacturer or
producer inducing the purchase." Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,
supra note 91, at 188.
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IV. RIGHT TO RELY ON ADVERTISING
However, it seems a distortion of the early common law to find that
a statement can give rise to an implied warranty. The action of express
warranty was intended to cover cases in which representations had been
made ;93 while an implied warranty arose where there had been no repre-
sentation.94 It is understandable that the courts should have over-
looked this distinction in their endeavor to provide relief for the in-
jured consumer. 95 The same philosophy, no doubt, underlies the ease
with which courts will find that vague statements amount to an express
warranty.96
However, if it be granted that express warranty be the proper basis
of recovery-as the fundamental distinction between express and im-
plied warranties indicates that it must-then, as in cases not involving
advertising, plaintiff's reliance, and his right to rely, should remain
essential to his cause of action.9 7 Where the statements constituting
the advertisement are vague or indefinite, or do not relate directly to
the type of harm suffered, reliance on them would not seem justified.
For example, where a manufacturer advertises that his electric
coffee-maker is "convenient, lovely, and will brew delicious coffee"
and the product explodes upon the first attempted use, injuring the pur-
chaser or causing damage to his home, can it be said that his advertise-
ment warranted against such an event? The same problem is presented
where the advertising is mere "puffing,"9 rather than an "affirmation
of fact." 99 The solution appears to lie in the adoption of a "reasonable
9 Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1888).94 VOLD, SALES §140 (1931).
95 "The law is presumed to furnish a remedy for every wrong." Colbert v.
Holland Furnace Co., 331 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 162, 164 (1928).
96 One writer has asserted that today a court which decides a case of warranty
brought against a manufacturer is making a policy decision and is "not en-
gaged in something so simple as completing a syllogism." Spruill, Privity
of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C.L. REv. 551, 566
(1941).
9s However, in Mannzs v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F. 2d 445 (3rd Cir. 1946), the
court, by way of dicta, said that because privity was no longer a requirement
under Pennslyvania law, purchaser did not have to prove that he had seen the
advertising, since the representations ran to the public. And in Worley v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W. 2d 532, 538 (1952),
the court said that plaintiff, in order to establish reliance had only to show
that the statements were "the kind which would naturally induce the pur-
chase." Cf. Degouveia v. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W. 2d
336 (1936). In this case plaintiff attempted to base her cause of action in
part on newspaper advertisements which were published after she purchased
the product involved. The court brushed aside this attempt with the statement
that the advertisements "of course, had nothing to do with [the] purchase."
Id. at 338.
98 For example, in Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A. 2d
715 (1953), manufacturer's statement that its glass jars were "as good as
anybody else's ware" was held to be puffing.
99 The business world, as well as the legal world, draws a distinction between
two types of advertising-"informative" and "persuasive". In practice, of
course, both elements are usually present in the same advertisement in varying
degrees. Informative advertising is considered the basis of mass production,
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man" test to determine plaintiff's right to rely on the statements. What
would the reasonable man have understood the manufacturer to mean
by the language employed? This test balances the time-honored doctrine
of caveat emptor against the glowing eulogies sung by the manufacturer
and, thanks to our present day system of communication, heard by
everyone.100 If the reasonable man would have understood the ad-
vertisement as warranting against the type of harm suffered, plaintiff's
right to rely thereon would be established. If he can further prove
actual reliance, he should be allowed to recover. On the other hand, if
the reasonable man would not have understood the advertisement as
warranting against the type of harm suffered, no right to rely would be
established. In such case, the statement does not amount to an express
warranty and it would seem that the advertisement becomes immaterial
and falls out of the picture. The case should then be decided as if no
advertising were involved and liability should be predicated upon proof
of defective manufacture. 1' 1
This would not seem to be the result, however, under the Rogers v.
Toni Home Permanent Co. case, 02 which indicated that so long as
.plaintiff relied on the advertisement, no relationship between statement
and harm need be shown. Disregard of the right to reply, especially in
view of the tendency to construe statements as express warranties,
would impose something very close to absolute liability on the adver-
tisin manufacturer. The "reasonable man" test would avoid such re-
sult. To allow the reasonable man to solve the problem of the pur-
chaser's right to rely seems sound in view of the fact that an express
warranty action is at least part tort' 0 3-an area with which he is very
familiar.
V. PROPERTY DAMAGE CASES
Furthermore, the same considerations should be involved whether
the case be one of personal injury or property damage. It does not
and its worth is recognized by most advertisers. However, persuasive adver-
tising-the puffing which insulates the advertiser from liability-is ill-re-
garded by the economist. Note, 6 VAND. L. REv. 376, 385 (1953). That this
anomaly should exist is indeed unfortunate. In practice, many manufacturers
are taking care of the problem themselves by satisfying the claims of ultimate
purchasers, in an effort, no doubt, to build or retain their good will, in recog-
nition of the principle that "a satisfied customer is a returning customer and
the best advertisement in the world." Bogert and Fink, Business Practice
Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 ILL. L. REV. 400 (1930).
'oo The advertising of manufacturer's product is "undoubtedly intended to and
would naturally have a tendency to induce a buyer to purchase it and to rely
thereon in doing so." Brown v. Globe Laboratories, 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.
2d 151, 161 (1957).
101 "This is not to say that a manufacturer who does not make public represen-
tations to induce the sale of his product is to be held liable to the ultimate
consumer without privity upon any other basis than negligence in the process
of manufacture or use of materials." judge Skeel in Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 105 Ohio App. 53, 139 N.E. 2d 871, 885 (1957).
102 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958).
03 Ibid.
1959] COMMENTS
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
seem justifiable to allow plaintiff to recover, for example, a small
amount for a cut finger but nothing if his house burns down. This
has been recognized, at least impliedly, by those courts which have
allowed recovery in property damage cases, where the manufacturer's
statements were considered express warranties. In California, the
manufacturer was liable for damage to cotton crops where his analysis
of the contents appeared on the label of insecticide.1 0 4 In the same
state, the manufacturer was liable under his guarantee of quality on the
label of his soap, to retailers for loss of business when the soap did not
sell-though retailers had purchased the product through middlemen. 10 5
In Nebraska, plaintiff was allowed to recover for injury to his lambs,
which he had vaccinated with the bacterin represented by manufacturer
to produce immunity in ten days.10 Under Louisiana law, plaintiff re-
covered for property damage where, contrary to his advertisement,
defendant-manufacturer had shipped a mixture of ferrous and non-
ferrous materials. 10 7 The Georgia Court would have allowed recovery
where the manufacturer, on an order blank furnished to retailer, war-
ranted its automobile to be free from defects, had plaintiff proved the
amount of damage incurred when the roof of the automobile leaked.1
0 8
In Pennsylvania, manufacturer was liable to consumer for the purchase
price of tobacco, under a tag describing it, which the trade considered
an express warranty. 0 9
Other courts, however, expressly distinguish between cases of per-
sonal injury and those involving property damage. Where the manu-
facturer's label on a jar of anti-freeze stated that the product was safe
and would prevent rust, the plaintiff alleged breach of express warranty
when the substance ruined the motor of his automobile. The Ohio Court
of Appeals refused to extend the "exception to the rule of privity where
104 Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041 (1954). In a
case of implied warranty, where advertising was not involved, California
law was construed to abrogate the necessity of privity where food manufac-
tured by defendant caused injury to plaintiff's show dogs, by extension of
the food-exception to the privity requirement. McAfee v. Cargill, 121 F.
Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
105 Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P. 2d 854 (App. Dept. 1948). In
Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A. 2d 715 (1953), man-
ufacturer would have been liable for commercial loss, notwithstanding lack
of privity, had his statement not been construed as puffing. But where there
were no statements involved, manufacturers were not liable for such loss
under theory of implied warranty. Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co.,
163 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tex. 1958) ; Karl's Shoe Stores, Ltd. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 145 F. Supp. 376 (D. Mass. 1956). Contra, Mazetti v.
Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913), where food manufacturer
was liable to restauranteur for loss of business, over defendant's objection
that plaintiff had sustained no personal injury. Decision was based on the
public policy which places an absolute duty on the manufacturer of food.
'Or Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W. 2d 151 (1957).
107 Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas Mason Co., 67 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. La. 1946).
108 Studebaker Corp. v. Nail, 82 Ga. App. 779, 62 S.E. 2d 198 (1950).
109 Conestoga Cigar Co. v. Finke, 144 Pa. 159, 222 Atl. 868 (1891).
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injury results to the person of plaintiff," 110 and held that liability must
be based on negligence."' This case seems clearly to have been over-
ruled by the two recent Ohio decisions," 2 despite the fact that neither
was a property damage case. Under similar facts in another case,
plaintiff tried to establish that manufacturer's label created an implied
warranty as against the wholesaler. The Washington Court adhered
to the requirement of privity since there was no question of public
health involved. 1 3 Similarly, the Texas Court, where the element of
advertising was not present, denied recovery under the theory of implied
warranty, where plaintiff's cattle were injured by insecticide manu-
factured by defendant, on the ground that, since the case did not con-
cern food for human consumption, there could be no liability without
privity." 4
Thus it appears that the trend is to allow recovery for property
damage where the manufacturer's advertising constitutes an express
warranty. As in personal injury cases, the "reasonable man" test should
be used to determine plaintiff's right to rely on the advertising.
CONCLUSION
Lack of the privity requirement at common law, together with the
dispensation thereof by most courts today where the manufacturer's
advertising amounts to an express warranty, justifies, historically, the
over-throw of privity in such cases.
It is justified economically by the modern systems of manufacture,
distribution, and communication. The presence on today's marketing
scene of the middleman, an economic necessity, should not be allowed
to undermine substantive rights. Whether the maker sells his goods
to the consumer direct or whether he does so through independent con-
duits, the essentials of the transaction-placing the goods in the stream
110 Jordon v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E. 2d 49, 52 (1949). Emphasis
by the court.
111 The court followed this rule in Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St.
273, 112 N.E. 2d 8 (1953), where there was no advertising involved and
plaintiff sought to hold manufacturer liable in implied warranty when an
electric blanket set fire to his house. In the Rogers Case, 167 Ohio St. 244,
147 N.E. 2d 612, 616 (1958), the court said, "Without commenting on the
soundness of the holding in the Wood case... suffice it to say that should
a case come before this court with facts resembling those in the Wood case,
it would then be time to re-examine and reappraise that decision," but it
was referring to the question of whether privity was necessary to sustain
an action in implied warranty.
:1 2 Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., - Ohio App. -, 149 N.E. 2d 181
(1958); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., supra note 111.
"13 Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348, 161 P. 2d 305 (1945).
"14 Brown v. Howard, 285 S.W. 2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). However, where
the cause of action was express warranty, made by the manufacturer to a
corporation which contracted with plaintiff, the city was allowed to recover
from the manufacturer since "the tendency of modem courts [is] away from
the narrow legalistic view of the necesity of formal immediate privity of
contract... !" United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of Waco, 130 Tex.
126, 108 S.W. 2d 432, 435 (1937).
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of commerce, statements made to the ultimate consumer and intended
to induce him to purchase, and reliance thereon by the consumer to
his damage-remain the same. Today, "the basic question underlying
liability is whether or not the manufacturer induced the sale of his
goods by direct representations of quality which were not true, and
the purchaser relied on such representations to his damage." 115
The liability of the manufacturer whose advertisement constitutes
an express warranty is justified morally by reason of the fact that
even after elimination of the privity requirement and the elements
of intent or negligence, a basis for liability still remains.1 1 6 This basis
is the duty not to make false statements and warranties, which, it is
submitted, is assumed by the manufacturer to the extent that he has
spoken.117 This duty is the correlative of plaintiff's right to rely and
should be governed by the same considerations. To the extent that
the manufacturer has expressly warranted his product, as interpreted
by the reasonable man, he has given the plaintiff a right to rely on his
statements. If the plaintiff is injured by statements upon which he
has a right to rely, the manufacturer's correlative duty not to make
false statements must give rise to a duty to compensate.
It is not justifiable that one who expressly warrants his product,
thereby creating in another the right to rely on his statement, should
be able to escape liability for harm suffered by one who does rely on
it. If a manufacturer opens his mouth, he should be made to open his
pocket-book. MARY ALICE HoHSIANN
115 Skeel, Product Warranty Liability, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. Rxv. 94, 113 (1957).
118 See Lucey, Liability without Fault and the Natural Law, 24 TENN. L. REV.
952 (1957) for a moral justification of the imposition of absolute liability
upon a manufacturer. However, Father Lucey does not consider the prob-
lem from the point of view of the effect of advertising.
117 "[B]y making affirmative warranties, rthe manufacturer] has enlarged his
duty beyond that imposed by law." Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290
Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309, 313 (1939). And see Brief for Appellee, pp. 3-7,
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612
(1958).
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